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Recent Development
Much Ado About Miranda
Kathryn E. Crossley*
I. INTRODUCTION
From 1958 to 1964, the Federal Bureau of Investigation reported
in the Uniform Crime Reports that the “incidence of crime had been
growing six times faster than the American population.”1 In the midst
of this crime growth, the Supreme Court focused on balancing the
need for order while simultaneously protecting the constitutional
rights of criminal defendants.2 The Court selected cases involving
poor, uneducated defendants and used these cases to revolutionize
criminal procedure.3 With this in mind the Supreme Court reviewed
Miranda v. Arizona.4
*  J.D. Candidate, 2000.
1. Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, Or Is It Irrelevant?, 10 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 461, 465-66 (1998) (citing LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND
POLITICS 40 (1983)).
2. See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (stating that an individual’s
fundamental right to counsel is protected by the Sixth Amendment). In Gideon the Court held
that in state felony prosecutions indigent defendants were entitled to counsel. Id. at 342-44. The
Supreme Court reasoned that if indigent defendants did not have counsel the contest would be
unequal and thus the trial would be fundamentally unfair. Id. at 344. The Court explained that
attorneys were necessities and not luxuries. Id. See also Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,
201-04 (1964) (focusing on the time period during which the right to counsel became
operative). In Massiah a co-defendant’s cooperation with the government allowed the
government to elicit incriminating statements from the defendant. Id. at 202-04. The
prosecution later introduced these statements. Id. at 201-02. Additionally, in Escobedo v.
Illinois the Supreme Court focused on the right to counsel as a condition precedent to the
interrogation of a suspect. 378 U.S. 478, 480-91 (1964). The Court determined that the right did
not hinge on the initiation of formal adversarial proceedings. Id.
3. See Garcia, supra note 1, at 465-66.
4. See 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see also Laurie Magid, The Miranda Debate: Questions
Past, Present, and Future, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1251, 1253 n.6 (1999) (stating that “[t]he Miranda
decision is so well known that it has spawned an entire lexicon of new words and phrases:
‘Miranda warnings,’ ‘Miranda rights,’ ‘Miranda waivers, ‘to Mirandize,’ and to ‘get
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Miranda brought forth a prophylactic rule requiring police
officers to advise criminal suspects of certain constitutional rights
before questioning them.5 In Miranda the Supreme Court departed
from its traditional totality of the circumstances standard of
determining when a confession violated the self-incrimination
protection of the Fifth6 and Fourteenth Amendments. Instead, the
Court adopted a bright line rule that required police to read suspects a
series of “Miranda rights” prior to custodial interrogation.7 If the
police officers did not follow the Court’s dictate before questioning
the criminal suspect, then they could not use any confession,
voluntary or not, in trial.8
Critics met the Miranda decision with hostility.9 Law enforcement
officers were particularly outraged by the Miranda decision, because
they felt that the Miranda requirements would hinder effective law
enforcement.10 They were concerned that the Court’s interpretation of
Miranda’d.’”); Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1418 n.7
(1985) (explaining that, in a 1976 poll regarding milestone events in American history,
American Bar Association members ranked Miranda the highest ranking criminal law decision
and fourth highest overall).
5. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; see also Michael D. Hathcher, Printz Policy:
Federalism Undermines Miranda, 88 GEO. L.J. 177 (1999).
6. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that:
[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. 384 U.S. at 444.
8. Id. at 478-79
9. See Eric D. Miller, Comment, Should Courts Consider 18 USC § 3501 Sua Sponte?,
65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1029, 1031 n.14 (1998) (citing Office of Legal Policy, United States
Department of Justice, Report to the Attorney General on the Law of Pre-Trial Interrogation
62-63 (1986)); see also 113 CONG. REC. 21187, 21187 (1967) (“Recently our struggle to keep
the criminal element under control has been hobbled by judicial decision.”).
10. Miller, supra note 9, at 1031; see also Magid, supra note 4 (discussing the effects of
Miranda).
Without knowledge of many limiting cases that follow, a person reading the Miranda
decision might well conclude that the Court did not want the police to obtain
confessions very often. The Miranda warnings go beyond informing a suspect of his
right to remain silent. Arguably, they were intended to encourage suspects to exercise
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/19
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the Fifth Amendment would significantly decrease criminal
conviction rates.11
Two years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda,
Congress responded to this near hysteria by enacting the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.12 Section 3501 of the act
made all voluntary statements made by a criminal suspect admissible
in federal court, provided the statement passed a totality of the
circumstances standard.13 Congress made its intent that § 3501
clearly replace Miranda, but that is not what happened.14 Instead,
since its enactment thirty-two years ago, § 3501 has remained
essentially dormant.15 The Justice Department and the courts
essentially ignored § 3501 in favor of the Miranda approach.16
In February of 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit revived Congress’ Safe Streets Act in United States v.
Dickerson when it refused to suppress a criminal defendant’s
their rights, reducing the number of confessions made to the police. The majority
opinion railed against many forms of manipulation, trickery, and downright sneakiness
employed by the police to obtain confessions. Miranda did not outrightly prohibit
these tactics, but the Court’s obvious distaste for them certainly affected its decision.
Under the majority’s apparent view of how an interrogation should be conducted— that
is, with no manipulation— there would be precious few confessions.
Id. at 1263-64.
11. See Miller, supra note 9, at 1031 n.14. Additionally, Justice White believed that
criminal defendants who would have been convicted on what the Court previously believed to
be good evidence would now, under the new Fifth Amendment analysis, either not be tried at
all or would be acquitted if the state’s evidence, absent the confession, was put to the litigation
test. 384 U.S. at 542 (White, J., dissenting). The Fifth Amendment only prohibits self-
incrimination in criminal proceedings.
12. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994)).
13. Id.
14. See Magid, supra note 4, at 1275 n.114 (citing S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 54 (1968),
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.A.A.N. 2112, 2141) (stating that “[t]he intent of the bill is to reverse
the holding in Miranda v. Arizona”); see also Miller, supra note 9, at 1033 (explaining that the
legislative history of § 3501 shows that “Congress made no secret its hope that § 3501 would
undo Miranda.”).
15. See Miller, supra note 9, at 1033-38.
16. Id. While no administration has clearly stated its reasons for neglecting to use § 3501,
there are two plausible explanations. Id. at 1036. “First, government lawyers may believe that
the bright line Miranda rules are easier for law enforcement officers to follow than the flexible
totality of the circumstances standard of Section 3501. . . . Second, the government may doubt
the constitutionality of Section 3501. Consequently, it may be reluctant to rely on it and risk
reversal of a conviction.” Id. at 1036-37.
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statement.17 The Fourth Circuit explained that § 3501 overruled
Miranda as it applied to federal law enforcement officers and thus
unwarned confessions are admissible in the prosecution’s case.18 The
Supreme Court, however, has decided to review the Dickerson
opinion to determine whether Congress has the power to supersede
the thirty-four year old Miranda rule.19
Part II of this Recent Development focuses on the actual Miranda
decision and Congress’ subsequent enactment of § 3501. it also
reviews the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Dickerson as
it applies to § 3501. Part III analyzes how and why Congress had the
authority to supersede Miranda by enacting § 3501. Finally, Part IV
concludes by explaining how the Supreme Court should handle
subsequent cases in light of its oversight in Miranda.
II. BACKGROUND
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda, courts looked
at the methods used to obtain confessions and the circumstances
surrounding criminal interrogations to determine whether the
criminal suspect voluntarily confessed.20 Courts determined whether
17. 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999).
18. Id. at 671. See United States v. Cheely, 21 F.3d 914, 923 (9th Cir. 1994), amended
and superseded by 36 F.3d 1439, 1448 (9th Cir 1994) (discussing § 3501’s application to the
issue of admissibility of confessions and concluding that the statute is not dispositive); United
States v. Rivas-Lopez, 988 F. Supp. 1424, 1434 (D. Utah 1997) (concluding that Miranda’s
warnings are not constitutional requirements, and thus § 3501 applies when determining the
admissibility of a defendant’s confession). Additionally, in  United States v. Crocker the police
arrested the defendant for using counterfeit money at a club. 510 F.2d 1129, 1131 (10th Cir.
1975). The police detained the defendant for approximately six and one half hours before
reading her the Miranda rights. Id. During the next twelve hours the police questioned the
defendant two more times and read her the Miranda rights prior to each period of questioning.
Id. at 1131-32. The trial court held that the defendant’s subsequent confession and her
statements obtained during questioning were admissible. Id. at 1133. The trial judge permitted
the jury to hear evidence regarding the voluntariness of her confession and then instructed the
jury to determine, based on the surrounding circumstances, what weight such testimony should
be given. Id. The Tenth Circuit held that the trial court correctly applied § 3501 to admit a
confession that also would be admissible under Miranda. Id. at 1138.
19. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted in part, 68
U.S.L.W. 3365 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1999) (No. 99-5525).
20. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); see also Payne v. Arkansas, 356
U.S. 560 (1958); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530
(1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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the “techniques and methods [were] offensive to due process” or if
the interrogation was made in such a way that the criminal suspect
“clearly had no opportunity to exercise a free and unconstrained
will.”21 If either of these tests were met, then the court found that the
confessions were  involuntary and thus inadmissible.22
In 1966 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a case
involving Ernesto Miranda, a poor Mexican-American who lacked
money and education and had an extensive history of prior arrests.23
In addition to Ernesto, the case also involved three other inmates.24 In
each situation the police interrogated the appellant without any
warning explaining his constitutional rights.25 Additionally, each
appellant made an incriminating statement, which the court later
allowed into evidence.26
The Court began its analysis by reviewing the history of police
officers’ use of mental and physical abuse to obtain confessions from
criminal suspects in police custody.27 The appellants argued that the
21. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304 (1985) (quoting Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S.
at 515).
22. See id. See also Garcia, supra note 1, at 473 (explaining that the Justices who created
Miranda had three choices before them: “(1) preserve the status quo; (2) reject the status quo by
injecting the lawyer at the arrest stage, thereby ensuring the end of confessions; or (3) reach a
solution which straddled these two extremes.”). The Court choose to “straddle” the two
extremes. Id. This choice was arguably conservative despite the harsh reception it received from
law enforcement. Id. A more radical approach could have completely ended confessions. Id. at
465. Additionally, a weaker decision would have countervailed the interests of the poor, the
uneducated, and those similarly situated. Id.
23. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
24. 384 U.S. at 456-57. Village of Menomonee Falls v. Kunz, 376 N.W.2d 359, 361-62
(Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
25. 384 U.S. at 456-57. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986) (holding that
it is perfectly legitimate for police to plant an informant who functions as a listener, not a
questioner, near a jail inmate to obtain incriminating information); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291, 301-02 (1980) (stating that pursuant to Miranda, police initiated “interrogation”
refers to “words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to
arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response. . ..”) (emphasis added).
26. 384 U.S. at 456-57. See also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 590-92 (1990)
(determining that the issue of whether the suspect’s behavior is testimonial turns on the content
of that person’s communication to the police, rather than the manner in which that person is
speaking); State v. Mitchell, 482 N.W.2d 364, 370 (Wis. 1992) (holding that Miranda applies
when the suspect’s behavior is both testimonial and responsive to the questions asked).
27. 384 U.S. at 445-47. See Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9 (1988); State v. Milhollin,
751 P.2d 43 (Colo. 1988); People v. Laspica, 612 N.E.2d 994 (Ill. App. 1993). Additionally, in
Berkemer v. McCarty the Court stated that the custody requirement mandates an objective test
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police interrogation tactics took advantage of particular
vulnerabilities of the poor, the uneducated, the inexperienced, and
minorities.28 Presumably, the police viewed these individuals as easy
targets for extracting confessions.29 Thus, the Court could not assume
that these individuals knew their rights.30
Against this backdrop, the Court set out to examine the Fifth
Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination with hopes of
providing “concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement
agencies and courts to follow.”31 The Court stated that these
safeguards must be followed “unless other fully effective means are
devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to
assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it.”32 The Court later
stated its desire to “encourage Congress and the States to continue
their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the
rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our
criminal laws.”33 The Court also explained that it “cannot say that the
Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution
for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is
presently conducted.”34 The Court later expanded on this notion,
that a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have believed himself to be in custody.
468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). Thus, the officer’s thoughts or intentions are irrelevant to the inquiry.
Id. See also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325 (1994) (stating that “[e]ven a clear
statement from an officer that the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself,
dispositive of the custody issue, for some suspects are free to come and go until the police
decide to make an arrest”). Id.
28. See Robert W. Landry, Miranda Challenged in Federal Criminal Cases, 72 WIS.
LAW. 18 (1999); see also Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417,
1418 n.7 (1985). Caplan stated:
 [t]he Miranda approach reflects a bias against self-accusation on principle. This bias
has roots in the desire to treat suspects equally. Suspects who do not know their rights,
or do not assert them, as a consequence of some handicap— poverty, lack of education,
emotional instability— should not, it is felt, fare worse than more accomplished
suspects who know and have the capacity to assert their rights. This “equal protection”
appeal finds its way repeatedly into judicial opinions and legal commentary.
Id. at 1456.
29. Landry, supra note 28, at 19.
30. Id.
31. 384 U.S. at 441-42.
32. Id. at 444.
33. Id. at 467.
34. Id.
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stating that the “Constitution does not require any specific code of
procedure for protecting the privilege against self-incrimination
during custodial interrogation. Congress and the States are free to
develop their own safeguards for the privilege so long as they are
fully as effective as those described above. . . .”35 However, the Court
then explained that “[t]he issues presented are of constitutional
dimensions and must be determined by the Courts. . .. Where rights
secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making
or legislation which would abrogate them.”36 The Court concluded
that the prosecution must demonstrate that it utilized certain
procedural safeguards during the custodial interrogation that induced
the statements made by the criminal suspect.37 The Court also stated
that precedent indicated that this Fifth Amendment safeguard
extended beyond federal trials involving interrogation by federal
officers and encompassed state police as well.38
To ensure that the prosecution and law enforcement officials met
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ protections, the Court
indicated that, prior to questioning, an officer must warn a suspect:
(1) that he has the right to remain silent; (2) that any statement he
does make may be used against him; (3) that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney; and (4) that if he cannot afford an attorney,
he has the right to appointed counsel.39 Furthermore, the defendant
may waive these rights, provided that the waiver is voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent.40 The Court explained that if the officers do
not read the above mentioned warnings to a suspect or if the officers
35. Id at 490.
36. Id at 490-91.
37. Id. at 444.
38. Id. at 463-65.
39. Id. at 478-79.
40. Id. at 479. The Court explained the procedural safeguards:
If, however, [the defendant] indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process
that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish
to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive
him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted
with an attorney and thereafter consents to being questioned.
Id. at 444.
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do not honor the suspect’s right to remain silent or right to counsel,
then any statement the criminal suspect makes during the custodial
interrogation may not be used against him in a court of law.41 Finally,
the Court noted that these safeguards must be followed unless other
effective means are established to ensure that the Fifth Amendment
right is a protected one.42
Dissatisfied with the procedures set out in Miranda, Congress
enacted § 3501 as a part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act in 1968.43 Section 3501 only applies in federal cases44 and
provides that confessions, if voluntary, are admissible evidence.45
41. Id. at 479.
42. Id. at 444.
43. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994)).
44. Proposed § 3502 would have made the statute applicable to federal review of state
cases as well. However, 3502 was eliminated from the final version. See S. REP NO. 90-1097,
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2138-39.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994) (emphasis in original).
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of
Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in
evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confessions is received in evidence, the
trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to
voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it
shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant
evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to
the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into
consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including
(1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the
confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such
defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he
was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant
was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such
statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been
advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or
not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when
giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above mentioned factors to be taken into
consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of
confession.
(c) In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a
confession made or given by a person who is a defendant therein, while such person
was under arrest or other detention in the custody of any law-enforcement officer or
law-enforcement agency, shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing
such person before a magistrate or other officer empowered to commit persons
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The section provides that courts should determine the voluntariness
of confessions according to the circumstances surrounding the
confession, including: (1) the elapsed time between the arrest and the
suspect’s arraignment; (2) whether the suspect knew of the nature of
the offense charged; (3) whether the police advised the suspect, or
whether the suspect knew, that she was not required to make a
statement, and that any statement she made could be used against her;
(4) whether or not the police advised the suspect of her right to
counsel prior to questioning; and (5) whether counsel assisted the
suspect at the time of confession.46 The statute declares that the
presence or absence of such factors may aid courts in the
determination of whether the suspect made the confession
voluntarily; however, these factors are not conclusive.47 Through
§ 3501, Congress eliminated Miranda’s “bright-line” test, which
required the police to advise a suspect of her rights. Section 3501
replaced the bright line test with an approach that resembles the
totality of the circumstances approach that existed prior to Miranda.48
Despite § 3501’s clear contradiction of Miranda, courts have
charged with offenses against the laws of the United States or of the District of
Columbia if such confession is found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily
and if the weight to be given the confession is left to the jury and if such confession
was made or given by such person within six hours immediately following his arrest or
other detention. Provided, That the time limitation contained in this subsection shall
not apply in any case in which the delay in bringing such person before such
magistrate or other officer beyond such six-hour period is found by the trial judge to be
reasonable considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to
the nearest available magistrate or other officer.
(d) Nothing contained in this section shall bar the admission in evidence of any
confession made or given voluntarily by any person to any other person without
interrogation by anyone, or at any time at which the person who made or gave such
confession was not under arrest or other detention.
(e) As used in this section, the term “confession” means any confession of guilt of
any criminal offense or any self-incriminating statement made or given orally or in
writing.
Id.
46. Id. at § 3501(b).
47. Id.
48. See Haynes, 373 U.S. at 513 (stating that “whether the confession was obtained by
coercion or improper inducement can be determined only by an examination of all the attendant
circumstances.”).
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never used the statute.49 In Davis v. United States Justice Scalia stated
that § 3501 “has been avoided . . . by every Administration . . . since
its enactment more than 25 years ago.”50 Additionally, Scalia
explained that courts should take up § 3501 sua sponte because
§ 3501 “is a provision of law directed to the courts, reflecting the
people’s assessment of the proper balance to be struck. We shirk our
duty if we systematically disregard that statutory command simply
because the Justice Department systematically declines to remind us
of it.”51
In 1999 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
heeded Justice Scalia’s advice when it decided the momentus case of
United States v. Dickerson,52 involving a 1997 Virginia bank robbery.
A witness observed the robbery and identified Dickerson as the
culprit.53 Then, on January 27, 1997, approximately ten Federal
Bureau of Investigations (FBI) agents, accompanied by a local police
detective, scurried to Dickerson’s residence.54 The police observed
the car used in the robbery at Dickerson’s residence, approached
Dickerson’s door, knocked on his door, and identified themselves.55
Dickerson eventually opened the door, after which the police officers
explained that they were investigating a bank robbery.56 Dickerson
then agreed to accompany the officers to the FBI station, but first
insisted that he get his jacket.57 When the police escorted Dickerson
into his bedroom to retrieve his jacket, they noticed a large amount of
cash on Dickerson’s bed.58 Dickerson put the cash in his pocket and
49. See Brooke B. Grona, United States v. Dickerson: Leaving Miranda and Finding a
Deserted Statute, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367, 370-71 (1999).
50. 512 U.S. 452, 464 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring). In Davis, the Supreme Court held
that police officers may continue to interrogate a suspect until he clearly and unambiguously
requests the presence of counsel. Id. at 461-62. The Court explained that an unambiguous
statement does not require the police to cease questioning. Id. Although the Court relied on
Miranda and its progeny, it refused to consider the implications of § 3501. Id. at 463.
51. Id. at 465.
52. 166 F.3d at 673.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 166 F.3d at 673.
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refused to allow the officers to search the rest of his apartment.59 At
this point the agents had not placed Dickerson under arrest.60
At the FBI station the officers interviewed Dickerson.61 Dickerson
first indicated that he had no involvement with the robbery but that he
had been near the robbery location.62 The officers then obtained a
search warrant from a magistrate judge based on Dickerson’s
statements and the cash at his residence.63 Agents searched
Dickerson’s residence and then resumed their interview.64 Dickerson
eventually informed the police that he drove the car involved in the
robbery, while another man, Jimmy Rochester, robbed the bank.65
The government charged Dickerson with conspiracy, four counts of
bank robbery, and three counts of using a firearm in relation to a
crime of violence.66
Dickerson moved to suppress his confession and the silver
handgun and money the agents obtained through their search.67 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held a
hearing on this issue.68 At the hearing an agent testified that they read
Dickerson his rights, and Dickerson waived his rights prior to his
confession.69 Dickerson, however, stated that he confessed before the
police advised him of his rights.70 The district court ordered the
suppression of Dickerson’s confession but denied the motion to
suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the confession.71 The
district court suppressed the evidence obtained through a search of
Dickerson’s apartment, because the issued warrant did not
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 166 F.3d at 674.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 166 F.3d at 675.
69. Id. at 675.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 675-76. See United States v. Elie, 111 F.3d 1135, 1142 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating
that evidence obtained after a confession made in violation of a criminal suspect’s rights will
only be excluded if the confession was not made voluntarily under Fifth Amendment due
process scrutiny).
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specifically describe the items police were searching.72 The
government filed a motion to reconsider the admissibility of
Dickerson’s confession, but the court denied the motion.73 The
government appealed to the Fourth Circuit.74
No party to the case presented or argued § 3501, but at the
direction of amicus, the Fourth Circuit held that “Congress, pursuant
to its power to establish the rules of evidence and procedure in the
federal courts, acted well within its authority in enacting § 3501. As a
consequence, § 3501, rather than Miranda, governs the admissibility
of confessions in federal court.”75 The sole dissenter in the Fourth
Circuit opinion stated his dissatisfaction with the majority’s choice to
argue issues not before the court.76 Judge Michael stated that “[w]e
perform our role as neutral arbiters best when we let the parties raise
the issues, and both sides brief and argue them fully.”77 Additionally,
he stated, that “[i]t is a sound prudential practice for us to avoid
issues not raised by the parties.”78
72. 166 F.3d at 676.
73. Id. at 676-77.
74. Id. at 677.
75. Id. at 671. The two amicus groups were the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) and
the Safe Streets Coalition. Id. at 667. The WLF was also amicus in United States v. Davis, 512
U.S. at 457 n.*, where the court explained that although briefs could be filed by amicus, it must
decline the invitation, put forth by many of the amici, to consider § 3501. The WLF also was
amicus in United States v. Sullivan, 138 F.3d 126, 134 n.* (4th Cir. 1998), where the court
stated that the amicus could file a brief, but the court would not reach the issue of § 3501. The
Safe Streets Coalition was amicus in United States v. Rivas-Lopez, the only recent case
declaring that § 3501 trumps Miranda. 988 F. Supp. at 1434. See Yale Kamisar, Confessions,
Search and Seizure and the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 465, 470 (1999) (explaining that
the Fourth Circuit originally upheld the district court’s finding that the statement of the
defendant should be suppressed). However, after the amicus organizations argued that the
confession should have been admitted unless it did not satisfy the totality of the circumstances
test in § 3501, the Fourth Circuit issued an order directing the parties involved in the case to
consider the effect of § 3501 on the case. Id. See also Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services,
Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) (explaining that it is well settled that “[w]hen an issue or claim is
properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the
parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of
governing law.”) Id.
76. 166 F.3d at 695 (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
77. Id. at 697.
78. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court soon will decide the validity of § 3501. The
Court will decide that the Miranda warnings are of such
constitutional magnitude that they cannot be discarded or that it is
time to revert to Congress’ long-ignored approach laid out in § 3501.
Clearly the Miranda Court wanted to establish a constitutional
basis under the Fifth Amendment, but it is entirely unclear what that
basis is.79 The boundaries of this landmark opinion are open to
interpretation. The Court explained that the guidelines it established
are “concrete”;80 however, it then explained that other methods are
acceptable as well.81 The Court then encouraged Congress and the
states to formulate methods of protection, but the court did not
elucidate the extent or limit of Congress’ or States’ discretion.82
Finally, the Court renounced its goal to encourage Congress and the
States to adopt other methods,83 explaining that these issues are to be
left to the Court and no legislative efforts can interfere with these
rights.84 Thus, the Court leaves a giant gap in its reasoning, inviting
Congress and the Court to interpret the case as they wish.
In post-Miranda cases the ambiguity of Miranda is more obvious.
In 1974 the Court explained that the Miranda rules were “not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution,” but simply
“procedural safeguards” designed to protect an individual’s right
against compulsory self-incrimination.85 In 1985 the Court struck a
giant blow when it explained that the poisonous tree doctrine, a
doctrine which presupposed the existence of an underlying
constitutional violation, did not apply to Miranda; thus, unwarned
confessions did not taint the admissibility of subsequent evidence.86
79. See CRIMINAL LAW— FOURTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT 18 U.S.C. § 3501, NOT
MIRANDA V. ARIZONA, GOVERNS THE ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS IN FEDERAL
COURTS— UNITED STATES V. DICKERSON, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 68
U.S.L.W. 3361 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1999)  (No. 99-5525), 113 HARV. L. REV. 1039 (2000).
80. 384 U.S. at 441-42.
81. Id. at 444.
82. Id. at 467.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 490-91.
85. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
86. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1985).
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One year later the Court explained that Fifth Amendment rights could
be protected by less intrusive means.87 Then, in 1993 the Court stated
that the Miranda safeguards are not constitutional in nature.88 Finally,
in 1994 the Court described the Miranda warnings as merely a
“series of recommended procedural safeguards.”89
Miranda and its progeny beg the question: Why would the
Supreme Court issue an opinion and then undermine it in every
possible way?90 Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that the Warren
Court issued the Miranda opinion, while the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts dealt the blows to the integrity of the opinion. The ideological
differences among the various courts arguably could be the reason for
the changes.91 In any event, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
recognized and took advantage of the lack of clarity presented in the
Miranda decision.
With in mind the ambiguity of Miranda and the subsequent efforts
of the Court to feast on this lack of clarity, only one question remains
regarding § 3501: Is § 3501 constitutional? Unless rules are
constitutional, Congress generally has the final say regarding rules of
evidence and procedure in federal court.92 Thus, as long as the
Constitution does not require a court-imposed rule, Congress can
trump the Supreme Court, even if the two branches are conflicting.93
Those who find clarity in the Miranda decision argue that the
Supreme Court has already rejected the totality of the circumstances
approach evident in § 3501.94 However, this is not the case. When
creating § 3501, Congress created new safeguards and expanded the
preexisting protections apparent in the old totality test.95 Congress
incorporated Miranda into a legislative scheme designed to balance
87. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986).
88. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690-91 (1993).
89. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1994).
90. See, e.g., Tucker, 417 U.S. at 144; Oregon, 470 U.S. at 307; Moran, 475 U.S. at 426;
Withrow, 507 U.S. at 680.
91. See Leslie A. Lumey, The Erosion of Miranda: Stare Decisis Consequences, 48 CATH.
U. L. REV. 727, 800 (1999).
92. See Paul G. Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. 3501 and the
Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L.REV. 175, 226 (Oct. 1999).
93. Id. (citing Joseph D. Grano, Confessions, Truth and the Law, 173, 173-22 (1993)).
94. 384 U.S. at 444.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994).
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the individual rights against society’s needs.96 First, Congress
incorporated the factor of whether the police had informed the
criminal suspect of the nature of the charged offense into its test.97
Second, in § 3501 Congress made the presence or absence of an
attorney a consideration when determining the issue of the
voluntariness of a confession.98 Congress did not simply revive the
amorphous totality of the circumstances test; instead, it expanded the
old test and established new safeguards and protections. The
guidelines established are appropriate in light of the ambiguities
evident in Miranda. In remedying its own blunder, the Court should
ensure that § 3501 is applied strictly, correcting the Miranda
oversight by protecting the original constitutional intentions of the
decision.99
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court is bound to uphold § 3501, but this is
somewhat disconcerting because the bright-line test established in
Miranda is good policy. The test assures that a suspect, at the very
least, will be informed of his constitutionally protected rights.100 If
the suspect is not informed, then any confession obtained is
presumptively involuntary.101 Section 3501 creates a test in which the
question of whether a suspect has been informed of his rights might
be a mere factor.102 Thus, because no one factor is dispositive, a
suspect ignorant of his Fifth amendment rights and without an
attorney could still voluntarily confess.103 Unsettling as it may be, it
is the necessary result. The Supreme Court made a mistake. Its
ambiguity opened the door for the creation of § 3501 and its own
96. See Edmund Oneill, Miranda Remediated, 3 Green Bag 2d 149, 152.
97. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (1994).
98. Id.
99. 384 U.S. at 441-42.
100. Id. at 478-79.
101. 384 U.S. at 479.
102. See CRIMINAL LAW— FOURTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT 18 U.S.C. 3501 NOT MIRANDA
V. ARIZONA, GOVERNS THE ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS IN FEDERAL COURTS— UNITED
STATES V. DICKERSON 166 F.3D 667 (4th  Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3361 (U.S.
Dec. 6, 1999)  (No. 99-5525), 113 HARV. L. REV. 1039, 1043 (2000).
103. Id. at 1044.
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subsequent attacks.
Accordingly, the Court should uphold § 3501 and rehabilitate the
original foundations of Miranda by applying § 3501 strictly. In short,
the Court should take measures to ensure unambiguously that the
constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination is protected.
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